Abstract
Introduction
Computing systems are now used in applications like automobiles, aircraft, and assembly lines. These systems often have safety-critical requirements; the computation must always produce the right answer. The computations typically require the coordinated efforts of multiple concurrent tasks.
Critical properties, such as mutual exclusion and freedom from deadlock, must be maintained by these tasks, but the This work was supported in part by ONR grant N00014-94-10228, NSF grant CCR-9209333, and NSF Young Investigator Award CCR-9357850.
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In such cases, some form of static analysis can often help a designer verify that the program will behave as expected.
Our general para~ligm is this: to abstract our systems into mathematical models; to characterize specifications in terms of mathematical properties imposed on models; and to verify that models possess these properties. There is a wide range in capability and accuracy of various modeling techniques, as well as in the complexity of verifying properties of the models [7, 14, 16] . The particular technique we use is model checking.
Model checking refers to a family of algorithms used to check whether a state-transition structure satisfies a formula in some temporal logic. Several such logics [9, 13] and procedures [6, 10, 15] have been proposed for this use. Our work uses CTL 1 model checking [4] , which runs in time linear in both the size of the structure and the length of the formula being verified.
The size of the structure normally dictates the cost of verification. When n models of size m are composed in parallel, the result can be a model of size m". This exponential blow up is commonly referred to as the state space explosion problem.
A considerable amount of research has been directed towards techniques for reducing the size of the model that gets constructed while applying model checking. Reduction techniques have generally followed one of two paths: (1) to avoid generating the entire structure, and instead to perform the check compositionaily or locally [5, 8, 17, 18] ; or (2) to form the whole structure, but encode it symbolically to reduce its size [2] .
We have taken the compositional approach, albeit with several unique twists.
First, w e negate a user-entered invariant, and then search for its counter-example. We show how this type of query 1 Computation Tree Logic -a branching time temporal logic. leads to a sound and complete theory of compositional model-checking, the preliminary sketch of which was first reported in [11] (which in turn extended the hardware analysis work in [3] ).
Second, we exploit Ada's rendezvous-style communication, and automatically extract "logical interfazes" for each task. This allows us to refine a task's model with respect to its communicating partners -even before their models have been generated. Third, we show how simple, "strengthening assertions"
can be used to reduce the cost of verification.
Finally, we have developed a Tcl/Tk-driven toolset, in which each phase of model-checking is implemented as a C++ class. In this manner, we have been able to measure the effects of various orderings of operations (e.g., compilation, composition, model-checking, etc.). We show some of these measurements in this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we motivate our compositional approach, and in Section 3 we give a more technical development of the theory, specially as it relates to verifying Ada programs. In Section 4 we show how our tool is used to support our approach, and in Section 5 we present some measurements of its effectiveness.
We also overview some of the follow-on work we plan to pursue. We conclude in Section 6 with some remarks on the usefulness of this technology.
Overview of the Solution
Model checking requires two ingredients: a set of models (e.g., transition systems) and a set of properties expressed in temporal logic. Transition systems are generated from the source code of the program to be verified, each of which represents a task in the concurrent program. In our current implementation we concentrate on Ada programs. As the rest of this section shows, our method is general, and can be applied to any concurrent programming language.
The domain of the properties we axe interested in includes two categories: safety and liveness. Safety properties express invariants of the system's behavior, i.e., they capture conditions that are expected to hold in each state of the system. A liveness property expresses a constraint on the future behavior of the system, i.e., that the current state of the system always leads-to an expected state. Our approach is compositional, albeit at the expense of some generality. We restrict our input requirements to the common "global" ones; i.e., of the form VnG ("in every state G holds"), VOG ("every trace contains a state where G holds"), and V O G ("G holds in all next states"). Then we achieve compositionality by taking a formula-dependent approach to minimizing each model.
Our algorithm essentially turns a verification query into its dual, and it progressively shrinks each model based on the (negated) requirements formula (see Figure 1) Formally, the compositional result is:
The right-hand side will often be considerably less expensive, since the inner calls to check conservatively delete transitions known not to be involved in any counter-examples.
Thus the final composite contains all potential counterexamples -but nothing else.
3
The Solution -Theory and Practice
In this section we describe the steps of our method in detail, by way of a running example.
An Example
Consider the Ada tasks shown in Figure 2 (top), where a program is composed of n (n _> 3) of these tasks. The n -2 middle tasks have a common structure (and differ only in their communications partners), while the 1st and nth are unique.
As can be seen in Figure 2 (bottom), we model an Ada program of n tasks as a product of n finite state machines. We abstract away data values and their influence on control flow. This allows us to concentrate on the task interaction, which is our chief concern -and it also keeps the associated decision problem tractable. Of course the price we pay may be a rather pessimistic analysis.
One requirement of our program may be the following property:
Whenever task Pi,i<, has terminated, task Pi+l will eventually terminate.
At the "user input level," this type of property is entered as a sentence in the universally quantified CTL (called ¥CTL), a grammar for which is presented in Table 1 . In Table 2 we present the interpretation for the full CTL, i.e., the logic with both universal and existential quantifiers.
Using ¥CTL, and the annotated labels in Figure Our Notation
f is true in current state for atomic proposition f. F is true on all (some) next states. F is eventually true on all (some) paths. F is invariantly true on all (some) paths. On all (some) paths G holds at some state and F holds in every state on the path prior to that state. Table 2 : CTL temporal operators. Table 3 : CTL equivalences.
more formally be represented as follows:
Here we use the familiar leads -to operator ("-,~"), which is defined in VCTL as One way or another, verifying this property entails: (1) considering the set of all states in which P~ terminates, and (2) determining whether every reachable path leaving those states contains a state where task Pi+I terminates.
The way we go about doing this is by converting the VCTL properties into duals, and then checking for counterexamples. We present the rules for such a conversion in Table 3 . As can be seen from the table, the dual of a VCTL formula will always end up in 3CTL, i.e., the existentially Satisfaction of an 3CTL sentence, F, by state, g, wrt. E, the set of paths in the model.
F--30G
£*~ Fiff3a E E : quantified sublanguage of CTL. The semantics of the 3CTL temporal operators is given in Table 4 .
Consider one of the conjuncts of our requirement F:
which possesses as its dual the 3CTL sentence:
Let fz be the initial state of the model of our program, and let ,r(i) the ith state in the path a. Then in the positive (universally quantified) logic, we are asking the question:
But instead, we will ask whether there are any counterexamples:
This is often (though not always) a much less expensive question to answer.
Models
Consider a system of n tasks, in which the states of task i are drawn from a finite set S/= {si,, s/~,...,s/=} where each s/~ represents a potential control point in task i.
On the other hand, a state in the full composition of all of the tasks will range over
We denote elements of S by vectors such as = (~j,, %~,..., %.)
where each siji E Si.
The set of atomic propositions, AP, consists of state labels introduced automatically during the model generation process as well as user defined labels that denote specific states in the execution of a task. We define a set of valuation functions for AP of the sort:
For each f E AP its complement -,f is also defined as an atomic proposition in AP such that -,f(~) maps to True (False) if and only if f(~) maps to False (True).
Transitions
The global, closed system's transitions T range over S x S, where if (~,~') E T, the interpretation is that the system can move from ~ to ~'. We alternatively use the notation ~ ~' to denote the fact that (~, ~') E T.
In practice, of course, we usually do not deal with global transitions -after all, we are aiming for a compositional strategy, where we can perform our analysis incrementally.
When task i is compiled, its local transition model is formed, which we denote ~ C_ Six Si. This model is generated independently of the others, and an element (si,s~) of does not include any information about the states of the other tasks.
However we can (and do) give ~ meaning in the closed system as well. The local transition system can trivially be extended into a set of potential global transitions as follows:
Obviously we do not actually expand out this set Ti. Rather, when the analyzer generates a local state, it uses the "wild card" symbol ("-") to refer to the other parts of the system.
For example, let (si, s~) E Ti, and consider the following symbolic transition:
We use this to denote the set of all potential global transitions consistent with (si, s~), i.e.,
{(s,,.•,s,,
•,s,)-(s~, ' ,' :
• .. s,)lVj si,s~ e si}.
...,Si,...
As we go about composing transition systems, and performing model-checking on them, we refine these wild cards into real system states.
Composition: Theory and Practice
If two transition models, ~ and Tj, were completely independent, then getting their parallel composition would simply be a matter of taking their intersection, Ti A Tj. But in general, concurrent tasks are not independent -they share synchronization and communication constraints. We capture this by a set of VCTL formulae, the conjunction of which we call a refinement relation• A decision procedure "chops off" transitions inconsistent with the refinement relation, i.e., those not allowed by the language's semantics. The refinement relation itself is generated by the compiler; it uses the source program and a set of target-specific semantic rules to form each clause.
We demonstrate this concept on our example program.
In Figure 3 we give a more detailed transition graph for task P1. The labels on the states are atomic propositions, which are generated by the compiler. But the intersection of these two models includes transitions that are counter to the semantics, e.g.: The entire relation, ~ is specified via a CTL formula.
The CTL formula specifying ~ is the conjunction of sub- and boolean connectives. In Figure 4 , we show the part of ~Z which refines the transition systems with respect to task Pi.
The complete refinement relation will be the conjunction of similar formulae for each task. Explanations for two of the subformulae (annotated in Figure 4 ) are given below:
1 If P~-I is ready to call "P_i.Ready," and if Pi is ready to "accept Ready," then in all next states both P~-I and Pi are in the rendezvous.
2 If task Pi is in rendezvous "P.i+l.Ready," then task Pi+l must be in the rendezvous at its "accept Ready."
The parallel composition of T~ and Tj can be defined as follows:
T~IIT~ ~ T~ n T~ n T~
where T~z is the largest set of transitions satisfying ~. The algorithm in Figure 5 effectively computes this composed transition model.
Model Checking
Our compositional model-checker does not try to make exact decisions about a property (which usually requires a complete model). Rather, it incrementally refines estimates using partial models. These estimates are conservative, in that if any counter-examples to the specified property exist then the partial models we return from our checks will always contMn them. As a result, if any check on a partial model falls to produce a potential counter-example, then we can immediately infer that the complete model does not have any either. To decide the subset of a model that satisfies a formula we recursively apply the projection functions shown in Table 5 . We note that while these functions yield estimates for partial compositions, e.g., Ti II Tj, they give exact results when applied to a composition that includes all components, e.g., T.
Consider evaluating an atomic proposition on the transition relation Tp. Assume that Tp is a partial model, i.e., and so only one of f and -,f can be true, and so in this case the projection function returns the exact result.
::ICTL Subformula.%" projection(T,~) f E AP ((~,~) E T I/(z~) A (x3,x~) E Tn} f A g projection(T, f) N projection(T, g) / V g projection(T, f) U projection(T, g)

f ((~3
Another crucial point in the evaluation of atomic propositions on partial models is the usage of the refinement relation ~. As can be seen in the first row of Table 5 The complete compositional model checking approach is summarized in Figure 6 .
Compositional Model Checking Toolset
The toolset is best illustrated by applying it to an example, in this case the n task chain example given in section 2.
Consider the property mentioned in section 2:
Whenever task ei,i<n has terminated, task Pi+ l will eventually terminate.
Or in CTL, 2. SELECT a specification stated as a VCTL sentence.
(a) Parse the selected sentence, negate it, and emit a postfix form 3CTL sentence.
3. WHILE there are any unchecked or uncomposed models DO (a) Either CHOOSE an unchecked model, removing it from the set of models and
• Decide the subset of the selected model that (potentially) satisfies the sentence.
• Remove non-satisfying transitions, creating a new model.
(h) or CHOOSE some models, removing them from the set of models and
• Compose the models and refine the composition creating a new model. If we can also prove ~" ..-* (~" A .A), then using property (1) we can deduce ~"-~ 74.
Steps of the analysis are summarized in Figure 8 , where justification of each step is written in the right column. The fines which are marked "*" indicate proof obligations, i.e.
formulae which are proved in following steps.
Step 1.1 : We note that the sentence F1 only constrains tasks P1 and P2; many (possibly all) states of the other n -2 tasks might be consistent with both F1 and -~F1.
This fact naturally yields the following strategy: to first run check(P~llP2,--F~), and see if the result is 8. If the returned set of states is non-empty, then it contains the potential counter-example to F1.
In our case the result is nonempty. Figure 7 shows the transition system corresponding to P1 IIP~ which has 43
states and 55 transitions. When we check -~F1 on PIIIP2
we get a minor reduction. The submodel returned by eheck(Pll]P2,-~F~) is drawn with solid fines in Figure 7 , and it has 37 states and 46 transitions. These may ultimately be shown to be unreachable behaviors, restricted by interactions with the other tasks. At this point they must be retained as "candidate" counter-examples, and they serve to guide the next steps in our analysis.
Consider the composite state (9,9) (marked with * in Figure 7 ). The state corresponds to P1 having signalled its readiness to terminate, after which P2 will prepare to terminate as well. But this cannot happen until P3 allows it, and so on. In fact, the self-loop on composite state (17, 19) is the critical transition for a counter-example, in that -~F1
holds if and only if the self-loop is taken infinitely often. So the deductive step which follows from property (1) is:
We call the model checker to verify F~ on the composition PI[IP2, and as can be seen in Figure 9 's dialog box, check(P~llP2,-F~) = 0; so F~ holds.
Step 1.2 : Now we have to prove term(P1)~-* (term(P1)A A2). To prove it we will use property (2) as follows:
We check VD(term(P1) ==~ vra(term(P1))), and do not get any counter-examples, hence it holds. I.e., once P1 terminates, it remains terminated.
Step 1 If we try to prove the property I2 on the composition PI[[P2 we will not be successful because I2 is related to the behavior of P3. So, as the next step we compose P2 and P3
on which we will try to prove F2 and/2. holds, then from F~ and I3 we can deduce/'2, just as we did for F1. So/3 is the proof obligation in these steps.
Step 2.4 : Now we have to prove the proof obligation from the previous step, i.e. 12. If we try to prove the property 12
on P2HP3 we will have the same problem we had for F1. So we use the strengthening argument again. Instead of proving I2 we try to prove I6 -A3 ~ A2. Then using property (1):
I2 -True ~ A2
we deduce/2. When we call check(P2llP3,-,I6), we get O as the result, so I~' holds.
Steps 3 -(n -2) : If we continue to repeat the operations discussed above we will get the same results until the n -1st step, since the intermediate n -2 tasks are identical.
Step (n -1) : In the (n -1)st step we notice that we do not need the strengthening assertions anymore! The reason is that we reached the end of the task chain, and Pn does not have to wait for any other task. It will accept all the calls from P,-1. So we first call check (P,,_lllP,,,",Fn_~) and get 0 as the result, so F,,-1 holds. Now we have to prove the last proof obligation from the previous step, i.e.
I,,-1, which will complete the proof. Figure 10 shows the result of check(P,,_~][P,,'-,In_l) for n = 5, and it is ¢, so I,-1 is satisfied, hence the proof is complete.
Note that, the proof given above is a semi-automated process. We designed the structure of the proof by examining the counter-example output by the model checker. After coming up with the strengthening assertions (which still needs human interaction) we used the model checker to verify the formulae in each step. We did not have to deal with the details involved in verifying these formulae, which may be very tedious.
Results and Future Work
While the introduction of our compositional approach has not increased the worst case complexity, if the worst case is realized then we haven't gained anything over the traditional approach. We believe, however, that for many systems and properties our approach can do dramatically better than the traditional approach. Figure 11 illustrates the tremendous savings that can sometimes be provided by our compositional approach. Here we are using the total number of transitions that must be examined and/or composed as the cost metric. In the case of the n task chain, when following the traditional approach our composition tool ran out of memory even for small values of n. But with our compositional method we never need to create such large n-way compositions to perform the verification, for any ft.
Our experiments have shown that there can be a large variance in the total cost of checking. The variance is caused by differences in models, formulas, and order of operations.
E.g., given two compositional checks of the same sentence, and on the same components, the total cost can be orders of magnitude apart! As part of our on-going work we are seeking to develop heuristics for generating compositional model checking schedules that, given a sentence and a model, would suggest:
• Which sentence(s) to check : Should we break the original sentence down into a set of conjuncts or disjuncts, and then check each new sentence individually?
• The order of checks and compositions : Which models should be checked first? Which models should be checked last? Which models should we compose be- Even if scheduling guidance is not incorporated into the tool itself, we see the development of some rules ojf thumb as being critical to the practical application of a compositional approach.
As part of our future work we intend to add real-time modelling capabilities. While there has been recent research in real-time model checking (see [1, 12] ), there has been very little exploration using a compositional framework. The addition of time makes this a significantly more complex problem.
Conclusions
We have developed an automated approach to verification that is compositional. As we have demonstrated with an example, our approach enables us to pursue verification efforts that cannot be handled by the traditional model checking
approaches. An additional benefit of our method is that in those cases where the property being analyzed does not hold we generate the execution paths that serve as counterexamples. We have implemented an automated tool-set that supports our approach and intend to expand both the toolset and theory with heuristics for selecting compositional verification strategies and support for real-time properties.
